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Abstract | This paper elucidates the unique qualities of Abenomics, the Abe 
administration’s growth strategy implemented in 2012, in terms of its policy idea, 
institutional change, and policy governance. The administration of Prime Minister Abe 
Shinzō was tasked with setting up the main goal of the cabinet to “break through the 
national crisis” by designating the “growth strategy.” This new strategy is now 
considered to have been a success, a feat which the previous administrations never 
reached. Since the “collapse of the bubble economy,” many attempts were made by the 
previous administrations to reboot the economy, but none of them was ever fully 
successful. Meanwhile, although the Abe administration’s growth strategy initially 
emerged from that of the Koizumi administration, it has been reformed year by year, 
corresponding to feedback and actual socioeconomic conditions. Abe’s strategy can be 
explained in three aspects: policy ideas, industrial legislation, and policy governance. In 
particular, the administration enacted industrial legislation that specify the government-
centered goals and logistics, and it has developed industrial policies based on this notion 
by regulating loan policy and regulatory reform. The Abe administration’s strategy is 
distinguished from other cases in that it reinforces the role of the prime minister over 
the entire decision-making process. Also, it stresses the horizontal relationship between 
government institutions and requires public support for cooperation between the 
government and the people.
Keywords | Abenomics, growth strategy, policy idea, industrial legislation, politics-
driven governance
The Abe Administration’s Efforts to Overcome a National Crisis
Abe Shinzō, a former prime minister, regained power after a sweeping win in 
Japan’s forty-sixth lower house election in 2012. The new Abe administration 
overtly specified its primary aim as overcoming a national crisis and began to 
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regulate the nation’s systems and society (“Abe naikaku sōri daijin,” 2012). Abe 
and his cabinet have been trying to resolve the national crisis through economic 
recovery, national reconstruction, and crisis management. First, the Abe 
administration has enacted “Abenomics” to help Japan recover from the economic 
stagnation that has plagued it since the 1990s. Abenomics has three targets: 
monetary easing, fiscal stimulus, and structural reforms. Another mission has 
been to reestablish Japan’s diplomatic relations with China, South Korea, the US, 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), India, and Russia in order to 
reaffirm and strengthen Japan’s position in the international world order and to 
thus reconstruct its national identity. Regarding domestic politics, the Abe 
administration has focus on people’s living conditions, territorial sovereignty, 
and social welfare—all of which had emerged as political issues under the 
previous Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) cabinet.
The reform of the Abe Cabinet is important in that it is a strategy aimed at 
transforming Japan after the postwar period (Yoon Dae-yeob 2006). In particular, 
moving on from the “lost two decades” and recovering from the nation’s long-
term depression appear to be the top of Abe’s agenda in his quest to reassert 
Japan’s position in the world. Since the collapse of the bubble economy in the 
1990s, the Japanese economy has moved back and forth between long-term 
stagnation and temporary revival; in the process, it has become a target of 
disputes about transforming or reinforcing the economy’s fundamental 
structure, sparking the arguments about whether to retain the Japanese model 
or change to the Anglo-American model. However, Abenomics’ monetary and 
fiscal policies and the transformation of corporate structure have indeed 
brought positive, visible changes, according to data. Recent studies have 

































Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (http://www.esri.cao.go.jp).
Figure 1. Nominal GDP of Japan 1994-2016 (Billion Yen)
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of national economic growth and industrial profits have increased. Japan’s 
nominal GDP in 2016 reached 537.4 trillion yen, increasing 42.8 billion yen 
from 494.6 trillion yen in 2012. In addition, by 2015 business bankruptcies had 
declined by thirty percent since 2012, resulting in the lowest number since the 
collapse of the bubble economy. The nation’s unemployment rate is down, and 
the wage rate has risen at the highest rate in the past seventeen years. The 
government debt, which was reported as being 3.3 percent of the nation’s GDP 
in 2010, has decreased and is predicted to be less than 1.5 percent of GDP by 
2020 (Cabinet Office 2016). 
Will Abenomics be able to overcome the seemingly insurmountable long-
term recession of the past twenty years, for which Abe’s foreign and security 
policy—the “Abe Doctrine”—became a turning point? What makes the Abe 
administration’s growth strategy different from the economic policies that his 
predecessors have instituted for the last twenty years since the end of the bubble 
economy? This paper sheds light on significant aspects of Abe’s policy ideas, his 
reforms of existing structures, and the nature of the policy governance in his 
growth strategy. The government’s role in pro-developmental states has become 
a controversial subject and has been discussed in terms of ideological background, 
economic achievements, political context, and circumstantial factors. This study 
concentrates on Abenomics’ achievements in microeconomic (rather than 
macroeconomic) planning.       
Political Economy of Economic Crisis and Reform: The Context 
of the Abe Administration
Reforms and growth policy to cope with the continuing economic crisis since 
the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s were the most important 
policy tasks in Japanese politics. To halt the long-term recession, mainly resulting 
from deflation, the Japanese government carried out full-fledged economic 
reforms, such as easing regulations to promote market competition, restructuring 
insolvent companies, instituting financial reforms, downsizing the government’s 
role in the market, restructuring the education system to increase national 
competitiveness, and reforming labor and industrial policy. However, in spite of 
this multilateral approach, the Japanese model, which became known as a 
successful economic model after the Japanese economic miracle, began to 
arouse skepticism and even suspicion (Chiavacci and Lechevailer 2017; Elder 
2003, 159-90; Kuk Min-ho 2016; Pekkanen 2004, 363-88; Vogel 2006). Industrial 
policy is government involvement in the market that affects the distribution of 
68  YOON Dae-yeob
economic resources. The Abe administration’s newly enacted policies include 
restructuring companies, easing regulations, and adding financial and 
institutional reforms; these are all ecumenical policies that other countries also 
adopt (Rodrik 2006, 2008), but Japan’s case is distinct and notable because the 
government’s role has changed tremendously due to the nation’s experiences 
with the economic crisis and its economic reforms since the era of rapid growth.
The role of the government in economic development in East Asia, including 
Japan, as the “developmental state” has attracted attention as state-society 
relations differ from the West. In the postwar period, the Japanese government 
was a scrupulous, rational-planning actor. It prioritized economic strategy above 
other elements of the national agenda and controlled the entire process, from 
recruiting competent officials to enacting actual plans for economic development. 
As the 1955 system came into play, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)-dominant 
political system started to distribute and reproduce resources bases on political 
interests. This was based on the Japanese developmental coalition, which 
consisted of a triangle of relationships among political groups, the government, 
and companies. Pilot agencies such as the Ministry of Treasury and the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (MITI) intervened in the market by using 
financial instruments and regulatory means to foster strategic industries. These 
institutions were also empowered to coordinate long-term economic planning 
between the government and private companies by using administrative 
guidance and policy networks.
Since the early 1990s, however, policy failures have been recognized as the 
main cause of the economic crisis, and as the political conditions and external 
economic environment have changed, the Japanese economic system has begun 
to change too. Subsequently, the 1955 system was no longer in force; when it was 
finally demolished in the 1990s, this act threatened the LDP’s dominance, and 
the role of politics in dealing with the crisis became more important. In an effort 
to reduce the government’s role in the market and, in turn, to pursue a market-
driven economy, the Ministry of Treasury and MITI, which have led economic 
development, reorganized into the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(METI). Meanwhile, the diversification of social relations attenuated the impact of 
the government-led policies. In addition, the Plaza Accord in 1985 resulted in 
large-scale financial reforms that gave the Japanese companies more opportunities 
to expand in the international economy while also increasing companies’ 
reliance on the Japanese government’s capital and technology development. The 
global international economic order and the imposition of trade pressures 
hindered the Japanese government’s financial policies that supported specific 
industries in the domestic economy. The most important agenda at that time 
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was to spread neoliberal economic ideas. Japan’s national economic crisis was 
the impetus to accelerate the nation’s reforms of its political and economic 
systems, as well as to help Japan turn into a neoliberal society by eradicating 
excessive regulation, economic bureaucracy, cozy ties between business and 
politics, and policy failures. Nonetheless, the aftermath of the Japanese model 
remains, even after these economic reforms (Stubbs 2009). Truly, since the 
1990s, these reform policies have begun to erase traditional industrial policies, 
such as new industry protection, political financing, government regulations 
that restrict competition and market entry, and export subsidies. However, other 
policies for specific industries, as well as those to support research, reduce taxes, 
provide human resources, and fund new industries have remained. In 2013, the 
Industrial Competitiveness Enhancement Act was passed; it alleviates excessive 
competition in the market and creates government-led industrial policies to 
support selected industries.
The roles of the government for economic development after the develop- 
mental state in which government-led plan rationality is mixed with market 
rationality are threefold: the decline and transformation of the developmental 
state, the change and sustainability of the developmental state, and the liberal 
developmental state (Pak Sang-yŏng 2015).1 Some scholars believe that Japan’s 
economic crisis during the 1990s was actually a definite signal of the decline of 
the developmental state and Japan’s entering into neoliberalism as a temporal 
phenomenon in the transition into another stage. Meanwhile, for the believers 
of transformation and persistence, the developmental state model was deeply 
rooted in social ideology, institutions, and relations, and thus it still existed 
because it constantly transformed itself. Concepts such as adaptive, flexible, and 
democratic developmental states are reifications intended to explain new 
properties and concepts that were born from the dialectical relationships between 
the developmental state model and neoliberalism (Ó Riain 2000, 157-93; Wong 
2004, 345-62). Indeed, all three types of developmental states can be applied to 
the Abe administration’s active involvement in the market and to its use of 
industrial policies to overcome the national crisis.   
The Koizumi cabinet, which pursed reforms under the motto, “Let the 
market do what it can do,” was a turning point in reducing the government’s 
intervention in the market and expanding the market-driven economic order. 
The Koizumi administration propounded “no economic recovery without 
structural reform.” Under this motto, it revived regulations against business 
1. Pak Sang-yŏng enumerates three concepts regarding the coexistence of the developmental state 
and liberal-market systems: residual, path-dependent, and synthetic hybridity.
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Table 1. Disputes over Japan’s Developmental State Model
Developmental State 
(pre-1990s) Criteria
Post-developmental State  
(post-1990s)
Ministry of Treasury, MITI Pilot agency METI
Promotion of strategic 
industries (comparative 
advantage)
Policy goals Promotion of strategic 
industries and competitive 
advantage (competitiveness 
improvement)
Policy loans and export 
subsidies
Financial instruments R&D investment 
Tax reduction on 
investments and exports
Tax system Tax reduction
Entry regulation and 
competition-distortion
Competition policy Public sector reduction, 
alleviation of excessive 
competition, and market 
restructuring
Public sector expansion, 
(formal and informal) 
regulation
Corporate policy Improved corporate 
governance and eased 
regulations
Labor exclusion and 
regulation
Labor Policy Labor market flexibility
Protectionism (of new 
industry)
Trade policy Free trade
Promotion of government-
led strategic industries (plan-
rational)
Market intervention Market-driven strategic 
industries (market-rational)
Administrative guidance Intervention method Administrative guidance
Crisis and Transformation of 
the Developmental State
Change and 
Sustainability of the 
Developmental State
Liberal Developmental State
•  Conversion into the market 
system
•  Provisional and exceptional 
market intervention
•  Conversion into 
neoliberalism
•  Path-dependent 
persistency 




•  The third model (combination 
of developmentalism and 
neoliberalism)
•  Interaction between economic 
structures and politics 
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investments and made the labor market more flexible. It abolished and/or 
transformed 136 of 163 government-affiliated administrative bodies. Some 
became independent corporations in an effort to create a more efficient public 
sector and to reduce fiscal expenditures. The Koizumi administration also 
liquidated poorly performing loans and pushed for postal reforms to normalize 
the financial market. These resolutions brought about a recovery in investment 
and production (Cho Cha-uk 2009). Bill Emmott (2007) explained that the 
Japanese economy was transformed into a neoliberal system through Koizumi’s 
reforms, which was explained as a factor of the “resurgence of Japan.” Koizumi’s 
cabinet established the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy as a key 
institution to lead the economic reforms; the national institution-led policy was 
correspondingly residual in the transition from the developmental state to 
neoliberalism. Vogel (2006, 213-15) argued that the Koizumi model cannot be 
completely explained by either the US model or the Japanese model. Instead, it 
contains a mix of qualities from both the developmental state model and market 
economic system. According to Vogel, the hybridity of Japan’s economic system 
stems from interactions among the “three rationalities”: market rationality, 
institutional rationality, and social rationality. To explain this, Koizumi’s reforms 
are indebted to the interactions among market pressure for transaction cost 
reduction, economic agents’ cost-benefit behaviors reacting against the system 
change, and the cost of social reputations and norms. These reforms changed 
the Japanese model, which began to be characterized as selective, differentiated, 
and open but did not wind up converting fully into the American model.    
In effect, the major question in Japanese studies since the 1990s has been 
what the Japanese government has done to overcome its twenty-year recession 
that almost no other countries experienced. Although some have examined 
aspects of the transition between the decline and conversion of the developmental 
state model and the hybridity of the market-driven and government-driven 
models, previous studies have been inclined to pay more attention to the 
structures’ characteristics and to the models’ macro-level achievements. That is, 
they have focused on the actions and conditions that motivated these policy 
processes, which remain a gray area. However, an examination of transitional 
characteristics cannot convincingly explain the consolidation of the government-
led growth strategy, especially that of the Abe administration. Furthermore, the 
emphasis on the “hybridity” of the two different models cannot reveal what 
makes the Abe administration’s strategic policies different from those of “path 
dependency” (Pak Sang-yŏng 2015, 32). These two perspectives not only regard 
the market as a structural condition, but also focus on reciprocal relations 
between economic agents and the system by defining the government in a 
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limited manner as a principal agent that controls the system. This study is 
meant to examine how the Abe administration has played a leading role in 
reifying “plan rationality” as a means to get over the long-term economic slump, 
even after Koizumi’s market-driven policies. I also analyze the nation’s industrial 
policies—in particular, promoting selective industries and industrial 
restructuring—from comparative and historical perspectives. By focusing on 
policy ideas, industrial legislation, and policy governance, I show the persistence 
of and ruptures in the Abe administration’s growth policy in the context of 
Japan’s economic growth strategies.                   
First, the policy idea is a recognition of the policy objectives and the role of 
the government to overcome the economic crisis. Industrial policies that affect 
the allocation of economic resources arise from the perception of a desirable 
industrial structure (Okimoto 1989, 238). That is to say, industrial policy is a self 
discovery process of reorganizing the industrial structure to maximize its 
potential growth and to minimize inefficient transaction costs. In fact, the 
growth policies that Japan has enacted since the 2000s have been aimed at three 
issues: underinvestment, excessive competition, and excessive regulation. 
Regulation reform was a passive way of affecting the distribution of economic 
resources. For this reason, the government continued to be more directly 
involved in the market through investment expansion, technical development, 
and strategic industry promotion; a mere partial change in the system through 
regulation reform would have not enabled the market to sufficiently distribute 
economic resources. Before the Abe administration, each cabinet had shared 
two goals and had constantly pushed for growth strategies. One of these goals 
was to recover the market’s functions and the other was to seek a role for 
government in replacing certain functions of the market.            
Second, while policy ideas are associated with the question of what problems 
should be solved, industrial legislation is more focused on how to solve the 
problems. Industrial legislation is a legal basis that is embodied by and 
institutionalized within the government’s authority and function.2 Basically, the 
system is a cognitive schema in which awareness of a social phenomenon spurs 
regulations against them accordingly (Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons 2010). 
Therefore, industrial legislation includes not only policy ideas, but also ideas 
regarding the transformative processes of creating policies; in this system, the 
policy elites’ beliefs are reflected and their experience is accumulated over vast 
lengths of time. The institutionalization of policy ideas is crucial in two ways. 
2. Refer to Yoon Dae-yeob (2012, 195-221) for institutionalist discussions of industrial legislation 
and government-led industrial policy. 
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Most importantly, legislation systematizes the government’s authority regarding 
the designated goals and means of industrial policy. In particular, direct policy 
methods such as authorization and financing can affect potential conflicts 
during policy processes. Moreover, policymakers, institutions, and other actors 
can overtly learn an institutionalized idea. 
Third, policy organization can answer the question of who solves the 
problem of reforms. Indeed, the primary goal of Japan’s administrative reforms 
since the 1990s has been to intensify the cabinet’s policy capability. However, at 
the same time, these administrative reforms have been meant to redeem the 
government for the failures of the LDP-dominant one-party system and 
bureaucracy (Pak Sŏng-bin 2010, 219-37). In the meantime, the central 
government has shrunk and cabinet offices have been established to consolidate 
the cabinet’s policymaking and practices, thus endowing more power to the 
prime minister. However, the administrative reforms have clearly failed to 
alleviate the tensions between the government departments that are carrying 
out the policies. In fact, cabinet consensus and a strong, vertically divided 
administration between departments have been the two traditional pillars of the 
bureaucracy-led policy system. Thus, the establishment of a new policy body 
that mediates between the government and companies and also plans and 
executes the relevant policies seems to be required to free the system from the 
old conventions. I will explain the discontinuous characteristics of the growth 
strategy of the Abe cabinet by analyzing the prime minister-led policy structure 
that is responsible for planning, promoting, and coordinating growth policies.          
 
Formation and Transformation of the Idea of Growth Strategy
In 2013, the Abe administration approved and announced a ten-year economic 
recovery plan that runs through 2022. The main purpose of this plan was to 
achieve an average of three-percent nominal GDP growth (two-percent real 
GDP growth) over those ten years. The administration pushed forward with 
aggressive quantitative easing and financial investment as macroeconomic 
policies to trigger two-percent inflation and escape from the nation’s twenty-
year-old trajectory of deflation. Another agenda for the administration was to 
resolve three issues—underinvestment, excessive competition, and overregulation—
through full-fledged restructuring and an active growth strategy, which would 
eventually lead to GDP growth. The goal of the Japan Revitalization Strategy, 
which was revised in 2015, was to raise Japan’s GPD to 600 trillion yen by 2020. 
Japan’s GDP had hit 533 trillion yen once, in 1997, but it had plummeted to 492 
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trillion yen by 2009. As a result of this plan, Japan’s GDP experienced positive 
gains, reaching 537 trillion yen in 2016. This achievement appeared to prove 
that the Abe administration’s growth strategy was working well. The 
characteristics of the Abe cabinet’s growth strategy can be summarized in three 
broad categories.
First, the Abe administration has continued elaborating on its ideas by 
issuing more detailed plans each year. When the Japan Revitalization Strategy, 
entitled “Japan is Back” was first announced in June 2013, it received international 
attention (Abe 2013b). Since then, Abe’s cabinet has modified the policy and 
changed the slogan every year to reveal the agenda’s new directions and goals: 
“Future Challenges” (2014), “Investment toward the Future and Productive 
Revolution” (2015), “Toward the Fourth Industrial Revolution” (2016), and 
“Revolution for the Realization of Society 5.0” (2017). Abe approved “Investments 
for the Future 2017,” the fifth version of the strategy, at a cabinet meeting in 
June 2017. Investments for the Future 2017 includes five indications for the 
pursuit of long-term growth: (1) It clarifies the support and aid for strategic 
fields such as healthy life extension, vehicle revolution, network reform for 
supply and production, improvement of socioeconomic infrastructure, and 
innovative financial services (e.g. Fintech). (2) It entails constructing a vast data-
friendly ecology that embraces fields such as artificial intelligence (AI), big data, 
and information technology (IT) to support the fields listed above. (3) It 
particularly stresses the need for regulatory and administrative reforms that lead 
to comprehensive social renovation. (4) It specifies that corporate governance 
reform will contribute to better policy efficiency. (5) Lastly, it emphasizes 
cooperation among the private sector, academia, and the government to create 
smooth flows within human resources, products, data, and capital.
It is notable that the name of the growth strategy changed from “Japan 
Revitalization Strategy” to “Future Investment Strategy” and the policy tasks for 
fostering the five strategic industrial sectors were classified into two groups: 
policy sectors and institutional sectors. The policy tasks included the establish- 
ment of a data foundation, the promotion of education and human resources, 
the construction of an innovative ecology, and the use of venture capital. To 
release these expansive regulations for the new strategic fields, other fields (the 
sandbox system, corporate governance, system administration, and IT related 
fields) were also reformed. The growth strategy before 2017 was designed to 
have three plans: the Plan for the Revitalization of Japanese Industry, the 
Strategic Market-Creation Plan, and the Global Outreach Plan. However, the 
2017 policy and institutional reforms added more tangible goals to ensure 
effective practice and function in the real world. Namely, the Abe administration 
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Table 2. The Abe Administration’s Policy Ideologies from 2013 to 2017 
Year Slogan Core Strategy Details
2013 “Japan Is 
Back”
Plan for the 
Revitalization of 
Japanese Industry
•  Shuffle business and create industry-based 
regulatory reform
•  Focus on human resource development and 
labor market flexibility
•  Promote science and technology
•  Become a world leader as an IT society
•  Renovate small and medium-sized 
companies
Strategy of Market 
Creation Plan
•  Achieve a healthy, long life expectancy
•  Develop clean and economic energy
•  Create infrastructure for future generations
•  Vitalize local resources and economies
Strategy of Global 
Outreach
•  Establish strategic trade relations and 
economic cooperation
•  Make plans to successfully join the global 
market




Recovery of Japan’s 
Earning Power
•  (1) Consolidate corporate governance
•  (2) Review and evaluate formal and 
semiformal uses of funding
•  (3) Vitalize industrial metabolism and 
support venture capitals
•  (4) Reform corporate taxation




•  (6) Support women’s power 
•  (7) Reform labor conditions
•  (8) Utilize foreign labor
Fostering Local 
Business as a New 
Growth Engine
•  (9) Develop agriculture, forestry, and 
fishing 









Investment in the 
Future
•  Encourage entrepreneurial actions to 
improve earning power
•  Prepare for the challenges of the new era 
(the Fourth Industrial Revolution)
•  Develop individuals’ potentials (focusing 
on labor, women’s skills, and education)
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Year Slogan Core Strategy Details
Local Abenomics •  Renovate small and medium-sized 
companies, as well as old companies 
•  Vitalize service industries and increase 
productivity
•  Allow agriculture, fishing, medical and 
nursery facilities, and tourism to be key 
industries  
•  Ensure that local governments fulfill the 
required new roles
Reform 2020 •  Construct problem-solving systems using 
technology
•  Establish new environments to attract 
foreign tourists
•  Expand direct investments and improve 
business environments




Project 10 to Reach 
a GDP of 600 
Trillion
•  Find ten new, emerging markets 
•  Implement local Abenomics






•  Introduce new mechanism for regulatory 
and system reforms
•  Utilize national strategic zones
•  Strengthen corporate governance
•  Open up assets such as PPP and PFI to the 
private sector
Develop Human 
Resources that are 
Innovative and 
Adventurous.
•  Support innovative venture capital firms 
•  Develop human resources 




•  Help small and medium-sized companies 
make inroads in the global market through 
the TPP
•  Expand exportation of infra-systems
•  Make direct investments in domestic and 
international markets




•  Enact the Renovation 2020 Project
Table 2. (continued)
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developed its policy strategies under the influence of actual economic conditions 
and the results of previous policies. In effect, when the Abe administration 
announced the “Japan is Back” project in 2013, it faced criticism because the 
policy targets were ambiguous and simply a list of all policies. These criticisms 
were plausible because the three agendas seemed more focused on resolving 
Japan’s general economic problems than on suggesting particular ways in which 
the Japanese economy could grow and develop. In addition, it was difficult to 
find any clear differences between the Strategic Market Creation Plan in 
particular and previous economic projects such as the 2010 New Growth 
Strategy and the 2012 Revitalization Project (Hoshi 2017). Accepting those 
concerns, the Abe administration modified the 2013 version in June 2014, 
keeping the three overarching frameworks but adding details for the recovery of 
corporate profitability. As listed in table 2, there are ten aspects to this plan: (1) 








•  Achieve healthy long life expectancy
•  Create a vehicle revolution
•  Reform supply and production networks in 
the supply chain
•  Improve infrastructure and establish 
economically viable villages
•  Fintech
Horizontal Tasks •  Create original sources of value by 
foregrounding data utilization, emphasizing 
education and human resources, and setting 
up a virtuous circle, resulting in innovative 
ventures
•  Use regulations to maximize value through 
a regulatory sandbox, regulatory reforms 
(simplifying the administrative process, 
integrating IT, and increasing earning 
power), and corporate-governance reforms, 
open public service and assets to private-
sectors)
Establish a 
Virtuous Circle in 
the Local 
Economy
•  Reform old companies and small and 
medium-sized enterprises
•  Develop agriculture, forestry, and fishing
•  Support the fields of tourism, sports, and 
arts and culture
Source: Shushō Kantei (2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017).
Table 2. (continued)
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consolidate corporate governance, (2) review and evaluate formal and semiformal 
uses of funding, (3) vitalize industrial metabolism and support venture capital, 
(4) reform corporate taxation, (5) create a robotics revolution, (6) support 
women’s power, (7) reform labor condition, (8) utilize foreign labors, (9) develop 
agriculture, forestry, and fishing, and (10) vitalize the health industry and health 
care services. 
In 2015, the Abe administration announced a new growth strategy by 
identifying the next step. The 2015 version was transformed into a supply policy 
to solve the problem of deflation and to sustain growth. It eradicated regulations 
in the supply sector and revamped the production sector. To achieve this goal, 
two other projects—Investment in the Future for Advanced Productivity and 
Local Abenomics—were also suggested. As a result of this supply policy, 
corporate earning power increased and bankruptcies decreased, thus alleviating 
deflation and eventually engendering a virtuous circle of economic growth. 
However, as the labor population has decreased, due to low birthrates and an 
aging society, this growth has stagnated. Therefore, the 2015 growth strategy 
dealt with the declining labor population with more sensitivity, considering this 
to be as a major obstacle on the supply side. Hence, the 2015 version verified the 
importance of investment in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, including in 
fields such as robotics, IT, big data, and AI; it also emphasized labor market 
flexibility and education reform to give women more power and enhance 
professional human resources. Additionally, regulations for small and medium 
companies were eased and the government’s support for local economies was 
enhanced in the 2015 version.
The revised growth strategy in August 2016 was defined as a full-fledged 
second stage growth policy after the reshuffle of the cabinet. The Abe 
administration was satisfied with its projects from 2013 through 2016 mostly 
because they led to regulation reforms in electric power, agriculture, and health 
services—all formerly sacred realms for regulations. In the 2016 version, the 
Abe administration added ten goals to encourage cooperation between the 
government and the private sector so as to ultimately create promising markets: 
(1) prepare for the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Society 5.0), (2) develop high-
tech healthy nation, (3) invest in environmental-friendly energy, (4) encourage 
the sports industry, (5) distribute housing and restore old housing, (6) improve 
the productivity of service industry, (7) create reforms for agriculture and 
imports, (8) promote the tourism industry, (9) elaborate on the projects for the 
2020 Tokyo Olympics and the Paralympics, and (10) enhance consumer power 
through cooperation between the government and the private sector.      
Another unique aspect of the Abe administration’s policy-making processes 
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was that it reviewed its aims and the results of the policies and reformed them 
accordingly. As mentioned above, the primary agenda for government-driven 
economic policies since the 1990s had been to resolve three problems: under- 
investment, excessive competitiveness, and overregulation. Underinvestment 
originated from Japan’s financial crisis, and it was the result of insolvent debts 
incurred after the bubble economy collapsed. In those times, Japanese 
companies struggled with excessive debt and excessive equipment, which led to 
a decrease in the equipment investment rate. Furthermore, implemented 
deflation and the 2011 Great East japan Earthquake generated pessimistic views 
of the economy. In a vicious cycle, this profound, growing skepticism reduced 
equipment investment among Japanese companies. The corporate investment in 
equipment was sixty-seven trillion yen in 2012, a decrease of nine trillion yen 
from seventy-six trillion yen in 1997; this decline added fuel to the long-term 
slump (Kim Kyu-p’an et al. 2016, 34-36). Overregulation has been a controversial 
issue in economic reform since the 1990s. In particular, regulation of the labor 
market, medical and health systems, agriculture, and electric power are sensitive 
issues, despite the fact that these fields were apt to hinder the creation of new 
markets and new technologies. In his keynote at the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) CEO summit in October 2013, Abe revealed his ambitions 
regarding regulatory reform by stating: “In order to break through the 
regulatory regime that has already become solidified like bedrock, both a 
powerful drill and a sturdy drill bit will be needed. I myself intend to serve as 
the drill bit” (“Keynote Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,” 2013). Excessive 
competition is another structural problem correlated with underinvestment and 
overregulation. The acceleration of globalization and free trade has already 
restructured major companies in leading countries into giant corporations. In 
Japan, a relatively large number of companies have competed in the major 
industries such as LCDs, diagnostic imaging equipment, automobiles, 
petrochemicals, and steel. Thus, the competitiveness has been declining due to 
overlapping investments and low equipment and R&D investments (Kim Kyu-
p’an 2016, 45-47). For instance, in 2011, the average research and development 
investment of the big three Japanese electronics companies (Panasonic, Sony, 
and Sharp) was 369.5 billion yen, which is lower than that of the Korean 
company Samsung Electronics (717.3 billion yen). In the same year, the average 
equipment investment of the three companies was 1.136 trillion yen, much 
lower than that of Samsung Electronics.
The Abe administration believed that, by resolving the three main issues, it 
would be able to create a virtuous ecology that could focus on wage increases 
and economic growth, so it reformed corporate taxation and legislated certain 
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“national strategic zones.” In addition, the Abe administration reformed and 
reorganized regulations in health and medical systems, energy, agriculture, and 
travel in order to nurture these fields by promoting new strategic industries. 
Meanwhile, to solve the issue of underinvestment, the Abe administration was 
actively involved in revising both the corporate code and the Japanese Stewardship 
Code, in what it called a soft reform, focusing on companies’ results-driven 
management. Regarding the labor environment, new policies—such as 
diversification of working patterns, aid for the loss of full-time employment, 
labor flexibility, reforms for foreign and women laborers, and the promotion of 
labor productivity—were included in the Abe administration’s mission note. As 
explained previously, the Abe administration’s growth policies from 2013 to 
2015 focused on resolving these three issues; the next step, Abenommics, which 
was initiated in 2016, looked at the Fourth Industrial Revolution and fostered 
future investment through spotlights on new industry markets.      
Another significant aspect of the Abe administration’s growth strategy is that 
it includes both continuous and discontinuous aspects relative to the preceding 
strategies of former administrations. Growth policies had been actively considered 
and applied in every administration since the Koizumi administration introduced 
one in an attempt to recover from the nation’s long-term recession after the 
collapse of the bubble economy (Hoshi 2017; Kim Kyu-p’an et al. 2016; Tabuchi 
2013). To be precise, the Abe administration’s growth policies stemmed from the 
Koizumi administration’s Outline of Economic Growth Strategy, which the 
Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, the Koizumi cabinet’s government- and 
ruling party-run policy institute, announced in July 2006. The Outline of 
Economic Growth Strategy (see table 3) suggested using human resource 
development, innovative capacity development, and research and development 
investment to enhance labor effectiveness and productivity. To make this 
happen, the Koizumi administration created new industries and innovations to 
strengthen national power, vitalized the small and medium-sized companies 
while financially supporting new industries and local companies, renovated the 
IT and service industries, generated new demands through corporatization 
(privitatization), and built systemic infrastructure for better productivity. 
The Outline of Economic Growth Strategy is a synthesis of various growth 
strategies from the early 2000s, which were dialectically integrated. In 2002, the 
Industrial Competitiveness Council under METI enacted its “Six Strategies for 
Greater Competitiveness” and the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, 
which is part of the prime minister’s office, voted for “Industrial Exploitation 
Strategy in Four Sectors.” The Industrial Structure Council organized its New 
Industrial Structure Vision in 2004 and New Economic Growth Strategy in 
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Table 3. Growth Strategy of Past Cabinet in Japan 3
Time Leading Institution Project 
May 2002 Industrial Competitiveness 
Council
Six Strategies for Greater 
Competitiveness
October 2002 Council on Economic and 
Fiscal Policy
Industrial Exploitation Strategy in 
Four Sectors
May 2004 Industrial Structure Council New Industrial Structure Vision 
June 2006 Industrial Structure Council New Economic Growth Strategy
July 2006 Council on Economic and 
Fiscal Policy 
Outline of Economic Growth 
Strategy
December 2009 Council for the Formulation of 
a Growth Strategy3
New Growth Strategy (Basic 
Policies) toward a Radiant Japan
June 2010 Industrial Structure Council New Growth Policy
June 2010 Industrial Structure Council Industrial Structure Vision 2010
September 2012 The Economic Strategy Council Japan Revitalization Strategy
June 2013 Headquarters for Japan’s 
Economic Revitalization
Japan Revitalization Strategy
2006, based on existing growth policies. The Koizumi administration was able to 
launch its government-driven growth policies because the cabinet became aware 
of the importance of aggressive reform policies regarding the market, the labor 
market, and the public sectors. At the same time, the Koizumi administration 
faced domestic political risks due to the nation’s population decrease and China’s 
participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Kim Kyu-p’an et al. 
2016, 44-45). 
After Koizumi’s retirement in September 2006, the first Abe administration, 
the Fukuda administration, and the Asō administration each attempted growth 
policies, although none of them was totally successful due to their short periods 
in power. After that, the DPJ government set financial integrity, social welfare, 
and growth strategy as its top three priorities. The Hatoyama administration, 
which governed from 2009 to 2010, was reprimanded for lacking a bright vision 
for the Japanese economy, so it rushed to embark on a growth strategy (Chŏng 
Sŏng-ch’un and Yi Hyŏng-gŭn 2010, 10-18). After introducing its New Growth 
3. The chairman of the Council for the Formulation of a Growth Strategy is the prime minister; 
the office was set up under the cabinet office, METI, and the National Policy Unit. The new 
growth strategy passed the cabinet council on December 30, 2009.
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Strategy (Basic Policies) in 2009, the Hatoyama administration announced 
another New Growth Strategy in 2010, with the slogan “Toward a Radiant 
Japan.” This New Growth Strategy contained seven themes: environmentally 
friendly energy; health; the Asian economy; tourism and local business; science, 
technology, and information; employment and human resource development; 
and finance. Through this plan, the Hatoyama administration aimed to reach a 
three-percent increase in nominal GDP, two-percent increase in real GDP, and 
ultimately achieve a nominal GDP of 650 trillion yen by 2020. Hatoyama 
established the National Strategic Unit (NSU) to lead these strategies, but this 
agency did not last that long because of Hatoyama’s sudden retirement. After 
this, the Kan administration took over with its Industrial Structure Vision 2010, 
elaborating seven strategic themes and twenty-one details, and it introduced 
New Growth Policy: Reform Hundred to Revitalize Japan in August of the same 
year. However, the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami of 2011 caused 
Japanese society to fall into deep frustration and panic in 2011, and the Kan 
administration had to act urgently to provide aid to the damaged districts, help 
them recover, and return them to normal as soon as possible. The recovery 
projects were intended to be an exemplary model to the world through 
pioneering and overcoming frustration. These projects had five purposes: 
helping the damaged areas recover, promoting green development, solving 
deflation, abolishing vertical relationships and old-fashioned traditions within 
the government, and ensuring strict progress management. The Kan 
administration’s recovery projects included a quantitative easing strategy for the 
first time to increase consumer prices by one percent (Kokka Senryaku Kaigi 
2012). 
In sum, growth strategies initially appeared in the early 2000s but were 
restructured with the Koizumi administration’s Outline of Economic Growth 
Strategy. The DPJ government changed the name of this strategy to Japan 
Recovery Projects. Moreover, in the DPJ version, the leading institution was not 
a council under METI: instead, it was led by special squads under the cabinet 
office: the Council for the Foundation for a Growth Strategy and the Economy 
Strategy Council. It is noteworthy about the Abe administration that its policies 
and practices are made possible by its long governing period. The Abe 
administration has benefited from this advantage because it can interact not 
only with the results of the previous administration’s policies but also with its 
own observations of real socioeconomic conditions. Based on these long-term 
observations, it has been able to develop and introduce new policies each year.
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Industrial Legislation and Government-Driven Policy 
The Abe administration’s growth strategies have focused on solutions to three 
issues—underinvestment, excessive competition, and overregulation—that have 
influenced national goals since the 2000s. The administration shares these goals 
but has modified and developed them multiple times. However, there are 
disjointed characteristics between policy organization and policy instruments 
that promote growth strategies. In particular, what distinguishes the Abe 
administration from others are industrial legislation and government intervention 
and the related policy measures. 
Industrial legislation is an institutional foundation that allows the government 
to legally be involved in the market so that it can influence market distribution. 
Industrial legislation can be either government-driven (plan-rational) or 
market-led (market-rational) competition. However, either can be an effective 
policy method that authorizes the government to legitimately engage with the 
market. Although old-fashioned industry policies were made under informal 
discretionary authority and/or administrative guidance, more recent economic 
and social reforms (largely since the 1990s) have been under MITI and METI, 
which were reorganized several times in this era. Examining the institutionali- 
zation of industrial legislation since 2000 can help comprehensively illustrate the 
Abe administration’s strategy in light of its ideology, authority, methods, and 
institutional discretion, as its strategy has continuously replaced or substituted 
for the market’s role.  
In the 1970s, the Japanese government began to intervene in the market by 
restructuring declining businesses and underperforming companies. Since then, 
the government has enacted industrial laws such as the Act on Temporary 
Measures Concerning Stabilization of Designated Depressed Industries (1978), 
the Designed Industries Structural Revision Extraordinary Measures Law 
(1990), and the Innovation Law (The Temporary Law Concerning Measures for 
the Promotion of the Creative Business Activities of Small and Medium 
Enterprises) (1995), the latter of which was meant to help the nation recover 
from the depression. In 1999, the Special Measures for Industrial Revitalization 
Law (SMIRL) was announced to resolve the three main issues of underinvestment, 
excessive competition, and overregulation, all of which were considered the 
major factors in delaying the recovery of the Japanese economy. The purpose of 
SMIRL was for the government to become involved in and gather support for 
the industrial reorganization of Japanese companies. Originally, SMIRL was 
supposed to be in force for only five years, but it was revised and extended two 
times in 2003 and 2007. After the DPJ cabinet came into office in 2009, other 
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details related to industrial-structure reform, productivity improvement, and 
promising new industry enhancements were added to the law. Later in 2013, the 
Abe administration introduced the Japan Revitalization Strategy, which was 
based on the “three arrows” of Abenomics. To branch out from this governmental 
project, the Industrial Competitiveness Enhancement Act was enacted. This act 
specifies an increase in private investments to foster industrial metabolism, 
reform overregulation to create a friendly environment for prospective industries, 
and resolve excessive competitiveness to promote international economic power 
and profitability. This act has three notable points.             
First, the Industrial Competitiveness Enhancement Act indicates that its 
purpose stems from a government-driven growth policy. The primary motivation 
for the act was for the government to support small and medium-sized 
companies and to establish an industrial innovation system to “rebuild new 
businesses, reutilize managerial resources, merge managerial resources, and 
renovate resource productivity.” Ultimately, this act is rooted in the belief that 
enhancing productivity is a prerequisite for constant, long-term economic 
growth. In the act, a leading agency is appointed for the business sector and the 
government only has to support economic activities. Article 1 of the Industrial 
Competitiveness Enhancement Act stipulates, “This act legislates the roles and 
responsibilities of national and business sectors, and thereby designates practical 
Table 4. Enactment and Amendment of Industrial Legislations
Time Name and Main Contents of the Legislation
August 1999 •  The Law on Special Measures for Industrial Revitalization and 
Innovation (LSMIRI)
•  Restructured the economy to enhance productivity: in force until 2003 
April 2003 •  Revision of the 1999 version of LSMIRI
•  Extended LSMIRI until 2008
•  Established the Industrial Revitalization Commission
August 2007 •  Partial revision of the 2003 version of LSMIRI 
•  Extended SMIRL until 2016
April 2009 •  Complete revision of the 2007 version of LSMIRI
•  Established the Innovation Network Corporation of Japan (INCJ)
May 2011 •  Partial revision of the 2009 version of LSMIRI  




•  Industrial Competitiveness Enhancement Act 
•  Enacted in January 2014
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plans to consolidate industrial power.” In particular, Article 4 and Article 5 
highlight the responsibilities of the government and business sectors in 
resolving the three issues listed above and in fostering industrial power. These 
articles explicitly state that the missions of the government are to observe and 
evaluate the industrial sector; the nation should carry on with valid and prompt 
strategies to improve that sector. This statement, which stresses the government’s 
role, is different from the stance about the government’s auxiliary role in the 
Japan Revitalization Strategy. Furthermore, Article 6 and Article 7 of the 
Industrial Competitiveness Enhancement Act contain provisions about 
“practice-evaluation-modification” procedures, which refer to the idea that the 
cabinet and prime minister have responsibility for devising practical plans, 
evaluating annual achievements, and eventually revising and modifying 
legislation. In principle, the act was meant to be in force for five years starting in 
2013, but Section 4 in Article 6 states that the act needs to be modified every 
three years. In reality, the amendment has been annually updated. This periodic 
cycle of practice-evaluation-modification clearly bestows authoritative power on 
the government and the cabinet in particular, and this cycle is oriented toward 
“plan-rationality.”  
Second, the Industrial Competitiveness Enhancement Act reinforces the 
policy authority of the government to intervene in the market for industrial 
policy purposes. In fact, the Japanese government has attempted financial 
reforms and restructuring to eliminate excessive competitiveness and help 
underperforming industries since the 1990s, but these strategies have not 
worked well. The nation’s main banks merged in the late 1990s as a financial 
reform strategy, and the Japanese government tried to regulate the market 
through a consolidated statement of financial position, asset evaluations of 
financial institutions, and restructuring of businesses through tax breaks, 
financial support, the Antimonopoly Act, and corporate law benefits. In 
principle, the Japan Revitalization Strategy clarified that the business sector 
plays a leading role in restructuring business and strengthening competitiveness 
and that the government is in charge of assisting and supporting all the plans. In 
the real world, however, a number of constraining factors have affected the 
business sector’s restructuring. This is because many of the companies wanted to 
retain the status quo or even downsize. In addition, many minority shareholders 
were limited in terms of their management participation, and their lack of 
participation discouraged businesses from restructuring. Regardless, only a few 
companies were sturdy enough to overhaul their business at that time (Arita 
2013, 31-39). To remedy these shortcomings of the Japan Revitalization Strategy, 
the Industrial Competitiveness Enhancement Act revised many details, adding a 
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reflection on each stage of the entire business cycle—establishment, growth, 
maturity and post-maturity. In particular, it is different from the previous 
legislation in that it clarifies the authority of the government to directly adjust, 
in addition to tax incentives, financial support, corporate law, and antitrust laws 
to support business-led restructuring.             
According to Article 50 of the Industrial Competitiveness Enhancement Act, 
the government conducts investigations of the market’s structure, creating 
relationships between supply and demand tendencies, as well as determining 
whether the oversupply structure is at fault when a business sector needs to be 
restructured. This article even guarantees the government’s authority to 
restructure businesses when the business sector itself does not make progress. 
Based on this article, investigations of the petroleum refinery industry and the 
steel industry were conducted in 2015, and plans for investigating the mixed-
feed industry were announced in 2016. The investigations showed that the 
average operation rate of all these industries was approximately fifty percent 
and that the price competitiveness of these industries was also low due to 
excessive competitiveness (Kim Kyu-p’an et al. 2016, 81-82). As such, the fact 
that the Japanese government releases the information about the over-competitive 
market is de facto administrative guidance that encourages (or hinders) the 
business sector to participate in restructuring. 
The DPJ administration once attempted to get involved in the market by 
utilizing government funds to reorganize the market and eliminate the excessive 
competition of the past. The Innovation Network Corporation of Japan (INCJ) 
is a public-private investment fund that was established in July 2009 to 
restructure businesses; it had an initial capital of two trillion yen. In 2016, its 
total capital accumulation was 300 billion yen, of which the Ministry of Finance 
possessed 95.33 percent as stocks, with the rest of it divided among the 
Development Bank of Japan (DBJ) and joint investments in twenty-six private 
companies (Sangyō Kakushin Kikō 2016). The INCJ is an investment institution 
whose roles include conducting research and development on the environment 
and biotechnology, both crucial fields in Japan, and commercializing the related 
technologies. The INCJ also financially aids start-up businesses, AI, IT, health 
and medicine, and other rising industries. Since its establishment, the INCJ has 
grown by entering the fields of business restructuring and technological 
innovation. It has been engaged in 114 businesses and invested nearly 984.9 
billion yen through 2016. For example, in 2012, the INCJ merged three 
companies in the LCD panel industry (Sony, Toshiba, and Hitachi), and became 
the largest shareholder by acquiring seventy percent of the total stocks. After 
that, the INCJ soon established Japan Display Inc. (JDI), which consequently 
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reconstructed the Japanese electronics industry. Lately, the INCJ has even 
attracted attention in Korea by organizing a consortium with Korea, US, and 
Japan. The INCJ also played an active part as the first negotiator in Toshiba’s 
memory chip industry.      
While the INCJ is a strategic finance institution that follows the market, the 
Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP) is a policy tool by which the 
government directly offers credits for the industrial policy. In the past, the 
Japanese government used to utilize strategic finance institutions to promote 
strategic industries, as well as small and medium-sized companies. However, as 
FILP became eighty percent of the entire government’s budget in the late 1990s, 
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as shown in table 2, serious problems arose, including inefficient distribution of 
resources and financial strain (Pyŏn Hyŏn-su et al. 2016). The aspiration for 
policy finance reforms began to wane as the Koizumi administration took office 
in 2001 because the cabinet’s main interests had changed. The Koizumi 
administration gave major responsibilities and roles to the public sector, even as 
it privatized the post office and other special corporations and restructured 
financial institutions. Basically, FILP funds are spent in three ways: fiscal loans, 
industrial investments, and government guarantees. Fiscal loans offer joint 
funding that is combined with FILP bonds, one kind of national debt, and with 
local governments’ and independent administrative institutions’ reserves. 
Industrial investments provide credits for strategic projects in the private sector, 
which was suffering from financial difficulties; these are funded by dividends 
from the stocks of government owned corporations (e.g. Nihon Telegraph and 
Telephone [NTT] and Japan Tobacco). The government guarantee literally 
means that bonds and loans issued by FILP are secured by the government. 
Indeed, industrial investments have dramatically increased since the start of the 
Abe administration. Even though the average industrial investment total was 
763 million yen from 1996 through November 2010, the government has added 
2.916 billion yen since the Asian economic crisis and 2.683 billion yen since the 
global financial crisis of 2009, and 4.059 billion yen after the Great East Japan 
Earthquake of 2011. As soon as Abe returned to office in 2013, the average sum 
of industrial investment reached 2.992 billion yen, four times the average from 
1996-2010, and this money was spent on industrial innovation.             
Lastly, it is worth paying attention to the role of policy innovation. Policy 
innovation was intended to be pursued during the twenty years after the 
collapse of the bubble economy, but the fundamental idea was contrary to the 
market-economy order. The Abe administration’s regulation reform began with 
criticism that overregulation had severely discouraged innovative management 
in corporations and hindered the promotion of strategic industries. To deal with 
this systemized overregulation, the Abe administration made provisions (the 
Special Provision for Company Certification and the Grey Zone Release) as part 
of Article 3, Sections 8-15, of the Act on Strengthening Industrial Competi- 
tiveness. The Special Provision for Company Certification exempts companies 
in the safe zone with stable revenue and business prospects from regulations. 
Once a company requests an exemption, departments under METI review and 
evaluate each case and then send a notification of the result. When the Special 
Provision for Company Certification conflicts with other existing regulations, it 
is supposed to be prioritized. Once all elements have been accorded with this 
provision, government departments are authorized to release or eradicate the 
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regulations. Although the Special Provision for Company Certification has the 
potential to adjust the chasm between preexisting regulations and new potential 
industries, the Grey Zone Release prescribes new regulatory strategies for new 
cases. In other words, a company can simply state to a department under METI 
whether or not its business will be covered under the regulations. When such a 
request is accepted, the department has the responsibility to investigate and 
respond to the petitioner. This two-way communication is obviously different 
from the previous, “no-action letter” system. The Abe administration’s 
Investments for the Future 2017 strategy clarifies that sandbox regulation 
reform is a national strategy, verifying that new industries in the national 
strategic zones are not covered under the current law. Once approved, potential 
industries can benefit from adventurous investments and advanced research 
under a regulation-free environment.       
Politics-Centered Policy Structure and Governance
Now we need to take a look at the buttresses that sustain Abe’s policy capacity. 
As explained, even before Abenomics, there were numerous regulation reforms, 
strategic industry promotions, and reorganizations of the industrial structure, 
but most of them failed to revive Japan’s declining economy. But the Abe 
administration’s policies appear fairly successful as of today, and we need to 
think about what is new and secret in these strategies. Since the 1990s, policy 
capacity in the world’s leading countries’ economies are evaluated upon how 
each country immediately reacts against actual economic conditions in the 
pursuit of neoliberalism and then how they transform their existing policies. As 
the world has become more democratic and civil society has spread, global 
companies have grown. Thus, the government’s capacity in designating and 
enacting policies, which was given as an independent and stable role for the 
government for a long time, became hard to predict. In particular, since Japan 
applied the Single Member Districts (SMDs) and the Proportional Representation 
System (PR), partisan politics, which is deeply rooted in pork barrel politics, can 
no longer retain its power tactics. In contrast, the system change led median 
voters to become more sensitive about their political interests (Rosenbluth and 
Thies 2010). Technically speaking, the system change was caused by worldwide 
socio-political transformations, and this change reduced the government’s 
authority and ability to interrupt the market. Therefore, the most urgent economic 
goal after Asia’s and Japan’s huge economic crises was to strictly judge government 
failures and, alternatively, suggest regulatory and administrative reforms. In 
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2001, the Ministry of Treasury, which was used to dominate expansive matters 
of the Japanese economy after the war, was downsized. MITI, which was the 
pioneering institution for industrial policies, was reorganized under METI. 
These transformations of the key institutions were meaningful signals to alert 
that the government’s role in the market was shrinking.
Swimming against the tide of downsizing government, the prime minister-
centered policy governance became consolidated in the course of the Abe 
Table 5. Abe Administration’s Growth Strategy Policy Organization
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administration’s growth strategies. To illustrate this, the Council on Economic 
and Fiscal Policy, which had been abolished by the DPJ cabinet in the past, was 
reborn under the Abe cabinet and still functions as the major control tower; it 
oversees quantitative easing and fiscal policy. The rebirth of the Council on 
Economic and Fiscal Policy implies that the ministers who had stepped down 
under the DPJ cabinet were able to return to their roles. The Abe administration 
approved the Japan Revitalization Strategy (2013-16) and the Investment 
Strategy for the Future (2017) and also established the Headquarters for Japan’s 
Economic Revitalization. The Headquarters for Japan’s Economic Revitalization 
was launched on December 26, 2012 under the prime minister’s office for the 
purpose of planning, drafting, and adjusting laws for the recovery of Japanese 
economy. Their tasks were to overcome deflation and yen appreciation, with 
cooperation from the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy. In Headquarters 
for Japan’s Economic Revitalization, Prime Minister Abe is in charge of the 
director, the deputy prime minister is a representative for the director, and other 
cabinet ministers are working as committee members. So far, twenty-six meetings 
were held between January 8, 2013 and June 9, 2016 (http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/
singi/keizaisaisei/kaisai.html [Accessed July 25, 2018]). Meanwhile, the Council 
for Industrial Competitiveness was initiated on January 23, 2013, under the 
Headquarters for Japan’s Economic Revitalization, to practice and evaluate 
ongoing revitalization strategies, and to keep reviewing the policy details on 
employment, human resources, education, international expansion, and 
innovation. The director of the Council for Industrial Competitiveness is also 
Prime Minister Abe and, as well as cabinet ministers, only private members who 
were nominated by the prime minister can attend the council. Although the 
Headquarters for Japan’s Economic Revitalization consists of cabinet ministers, 
seven out of nine members in the Council for Industrial Competitiveness are 
CEOs (Nihon keizai shinbun, January 9, 2013).4 The Public-Private Partnership 
for the Future Investments is a cooperative council, organized by the prime 
minister, established in 2015 to better serve the Japan Revitalization Strategy. In 
the first meeting, Abe stated, “Corporate profits reached a historical high but 
increase of investments had yet to be successful enough,” and added that 
“industry needs to show a promising vision for the expansion of investments.” 
His statements reveal that the Public-Private Partnership for the Future 
4. Private Members in Council for Industrial Competitiveness are Hasegawa Yasuchika (Takeda 
Pharmaseutical Co Ltd), Sakane Masa (Komatsu), Satō Yasuhiro (Mizuho FG), Sakakibara 
Sadayuki (Toray), Mikitani Hiroshi (Rakuten), Niinami Takeshi (Lawson), Akiyama Sakie (Sakie 
Corporation), Takenaka Heizō (Professor at Keio University), Hashimoto Kazuhito (Professor at 
the University of Tokyo).
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Investments is a cooperative institution to expand corporations’ investments in 
order to satisfy the government’s policy. The Japanese government launched the 
second stage of policy strategies in 2016, specifically related to the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution. Later, the Headquarters for Japan’s Economic Revitalization, 
the Council for Industrial Competitiveness, and Public-Private Partnership for 
the Future Investments were integrated under the Council on Investments for 
the Future. Prime Minister Abe participated in all the meetings held by the 
aforementioned organizations, except once on May 29, 2013, showing his strong 
will and interest.5
The prime minister-centered policy governance and horizontal relationships 
among the departments have been systematic. Cooperation and strong ties 
between the departments are necessary for industrial policies to efficiently 
work. In the case of Abe’s policies, since the Headquarters for Japan’s Economic 
Revitalization basically supervises the Japan Revitalization Strategy, other 
departments are forced to participate in every process. Each department works 
on details to carry out the policies under the guidance of a sub-committee. In 
2016 METI announced the second stage of the growth strategy for the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution, named New Industry Vision. The Council for Industrial 
Competitiveness immediately set up the Public-Private Expert Council for 
Promotion of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, under the prime minister’s 
direct watch, and started to manage the New Industry Vision (Keizai Sangyōshō 
2017; Shushō Kantei 2016). The Public-Private Expert Council seeks regulatory 
reform and human resource development to ultimately create platforms for 
rising industries. The council established sub-councils such as the AI. 
Technology Strategy Council, the Council for Human Resource Development for 
the Fourth Industrial Revolution, and the Robot Revolution Realization 
Council. The Robot Revolution Realization Council is the top policy organization, 
which major industries, academia, and research institutions join. These 
institutions include the Japan Machinery Federation (JMF), Japan Electronics 
and Information Technology Industries Association (JEITA), and the Japan 
Electrical Manufacturers’ Association (JEMA), and Japan Robot Association. 
Also, the AI. Technology Strategy Council was established in April 2016 to 
comprehensively manage policies related to AI. It is policy governance including 
not only three departments (the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 
5. Twenty-six meetings held by the Headquarters for Japan’s Economic Revitalization, ten meetings 
held by the Council on Investments for the Future, twenty-eight meetings held by the Council for 
Industrial Competitiveness, five meetings held by the Public-Private Expert Council for 
Promotion of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. See the details at  http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/
keizaisaisei/#news.
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the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, and METI), 
but also research and administrative institutions including National Institute of 
Information and Communications Technology (NICT), RIKEN, National 
Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), Japan Science 
and Technology Agency (JST), and New Energy and Industrial Technology 
Development Organization (NEDO) (Kim Kyu-p’an et al. 2016, 143-54).        
Likewise, the Abe administration’s growth policies have consolidated the 
prime minister-centered system and pursued horizontal governance relationships 
among departments, based on the cooperation between government and private 
sectors. These tendencies are different from pre-existing models of government-
driven systems or policy governance, which arose as key concepts in the late 
1990s. One of the missions for the Hashimoto cabinet was to change from the 
bureaucrat-led system to state-driven policy governance (Han Euisuok 2013, 
145-72). After the war, under the 1955 System, the relationship among the 
cabinet members was defined by three principles: the prime minister assumed 
the leading role, general consensus should be followed, and determination based 
on consensus had jurisdiction (Shindō 2015, 311-12). For instance, the prime 
minister had the authority of the appointment and dismissal but his decision 
was based on consensus among the cabinet members. Ministers in each ministry 
were in charge of sharing ideas and working duties. And yet, the prime minister’s 
authority of appointment and dismissal operated in the shadow of partisan 
politics in many cases, and discussions occurred in the Council for Administrative 
Vice-minister in the past. For this reason, Japan’s policy process was criticized as 
the “bureaucratic cabinet system,” in which the bureaucracy was the master and 
the minister was the stranger. Hence, the Hashimoto administration had to push 
administrative reform because the authority of the prime minister needed to be 
rebuilt as the LDP dominancy was threatened and his power was diminishing. 
The Hashimoto administration attempted to reconsolidate the prime minister’s 
power by establishing the Administrative Reform Council, reforming the 
central government and fiscal policy, and reconstructing the cabinet office and 
prime minister’s initiative. Following this, Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō 
used the administrative reforms that had already begun under the Hashimoto 
administration as a strategy for his economic reforms. Following the central 
government reform in 2001 under the Hashimoto cabinet, the Koizumi 
administration established the Council for Science, Technology, and Innovation, 
the Disaster Management in Japan, and the Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet 
Office under the cabinet office. The Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy was 
approved to assist financial policies. The Koizumi administration utilized the 
Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy as a leading institution for compilation 
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of the budget, financial reform, and privatization of the post. Koizumi’s reforms 
were closer to “reforms under the strong leadership,” rather than an essential 
reformation of “state-driven policy” (Han Euisuok 2013, 129-31).
But in effect, fullly-fledged politics-driven system reforms were actually 
initiated first by the DPJ cabinet. In 2009, the DPJ pushed ahead with the slogan 
of “from bureaucrat-centered policy to politics-driven policy.” For this, the DPJ 
cabinet abolished the Administrative Vice-minister’s Council, which was an 
institutional framework for bureaucrat-centered policy, and the Policy Research 
Council. Instead, the government’s role was reemphasized; the Cabinet 
Secretariat was empowered and the National Policy Unit was established on 
September 18, 2009. These two institutions work on comprehensive issues 
related to tax and general economic matters. However, the National Policy Unit 
was established by the cabinet, and thus its legal basis became controversial. The 
authority and function of the departments have not reached a consensus and 
the conflict is still an ongoing issue (Pak Sŏng-bin 2010, 230-31). In the hope of 
offering a legal backing to the National Policy Unit, on February 5, 2010, the 
DPJ proposed bills for administrative functions. But the DPJ faced disagreement 
from the opposite party and Hatoyama’s resignation delayed the process. In the 
end, the bill was cancelled in the lower house in May 2011 (Han Euisuok 2013, 
163). Instead, the Noda administration launched the National Strategy Bureau 
on October 21, 2011 to comprehensively manage economic and tax reforms. 
Prime Minister Noda was in charge as chairman, while the deputy prime 
minister, the chief cabinet secretary, and minister of national strategy were 
collectively in charge of vice-chairman. Ministers and five members from the 
private sector also attended.6 The National Strategy Bureau works for major 
policy goals of the Japan Revitalization Strategy, and it established the Council 
for Energy and Environment in 2011, as an institution for energy resource 
policy and global warming. On January 25, 2012, the Frontier Branch embarked 
in pursuit of four themes: prosperity (growth strategy for middle class), 
happiness (social security for future generation), foresight (human resource 
development and strategy for space and science), and peace (diplomat and 
marine policy) (Naikaku Kanbō Kokka Senryakushitsu 2012). In spite of all 
these efforts, policy institutions were lacking a legal basis, and it raised problems 
in the DPJ’s leadership, which consequently engendered conflicts among the 
departments and confusion about the direction of the policies. The DPJ cabinets 
6. Iwata Kazumasa (president of Japan Center for Economic Research [JCER]), Ogata Sadako 
(special advisor to president at JICA), Koga Nobuaki (president of JTUC), Hasegawa Yashuchika 
(chief executive officer of Takeda Pharmaceuticals International AG), Yonekura Hiromasa 
(chairman of Sumimoto Chemical).
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were sensitive about the strong ties between ministers and the LDP groups and 
tried to exclude those groups when making decisions. For this reason, the 
relationship between the cabinets and officials were never sturdy and the 
impetus to make things happen was irrevocably weak. The Abe administration 
overwhelmed the DPJ’s flaws by establishing councils and committees directly 
belonging to the cabinet office at their discretion. They also carried out a 
growth strategy through the prime minister-centered designations and each 
department’s policy governance.       
 
Conclusion 
The second Abe administration made great effort to reform national security, 
economy, society, and politics to overcome Japan’s national crisis. In particular, 
the economic strategy “Abenomics,” aimed at solving the long-term stagnation 
and rebooting the Japanese economy, has been a success. As a result, the 
Japanese domestic economy began to revive as personal consumption and 
corporate investments increased. The economic growth rate increased for six 
consecutive quarters for the first time since the Koizumi administration. The 
Abe administration’s economic reforms have also resulted in other positive 
aspects: equipment investment, household consumption expenditures, and even 
GDP increased.            
The policy idea of economy growth through government intervention is not 
new with the Abe cabinet. In the early 2000s, the Koizumi administration first 
touched upon such a growth policy by reviewing strategic industry promotions 
and restructuring industries as the administration confronted a decrease in 
population domestically and China’s entry into the WTO externally. After this, 
following administrations, such as the first Abe administration, the Fukuda 
administration, and the Asō administration, continued Koizumi’s strategy. The 
DPJ administrations initiated a shake-up through expanding the welfare plan 
and recovering the economy after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake. 
However, a lack of strong leadership and stable systems were always admonished 
as reasons for the failure of the DPJ cabinets. The second Abe administration’s 
growth strategies aimed at quantitative easing and financial investments, as well 
as pursuing the Japan Revitalization Strategy. Again, the primary purposes of 
the Japan Revitalization Strategy were to solve three main issues: underinvest- 
ment, excessive competition, and overregulation. Another crucial mission was 
to promote a fertile environment for Japan’s constant economic growth. In order 
to successfully reach these goals, the government has updated new versions of 
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the Japan Revitalization Strategy each year, based on the reactions to the results 
and real economic conditions. In 2017, the strategy went beyond to the second 
stage, re-named the Investments for the Future. In addition, the Industrial 
Competitiveness Enhancement Act, which was approved in 2013, clarified the 
roles and responsibilities of the government to supervise the entire process of 
the growth strategy. Namely, the Industrial Competitiveness Enhancement Act 
reveals the main responsibility and leading role of the government to enhance 
the Japanese economy by guaranteeing a legislative systemic basis, although the 
previous legislations stayed at only mentioning government’s indirect aid. 
Beginning with this act, the government has utilized “direct policy measures” 
such as financial support, which effects the distribution of economic resources. 
Policy organizations such as the Headquarters for Japan’s Economic Revitalization, 
under the prime minister’s office and the cabinet office, is a institutional basis 
for the prime minister to legitimately plan, practice, and adjust policies by 
leading the cooperative governance between the public and the private sectors.
In conclusion, the Abe administration’s achievements with the growth 
strategy have implication for academic research on the Japanese model of 
development after the crisis and its industrial policy. If success of Abenomics 
came from the historical context of Japanese growth policies, this new model 
can be an exemplary empirical case for “path-dependent developmental states.” 
Since Abenomics, other East Asian countries have begun to implement 
government-driven industrial policies. President Moon Jae-in enacted the 
Innovation-Led Growth Project in South Korea and President Xi Jinping 
announced the Made in China 2025, which are regarded “Asianomics.” The rise 
of the government-driven industrial policies in East Asia is a unique phenomenon 
in terms of their collective experience. First, each country has experienced a 
similar industrial structure, decrease of population, and innovative capacity in 
the domestic market. Second, at the macro level, strategic industries in each 
country are competitive but dependent upon each other at the same time (Yoon 
Dae-yeob 2015, 168-95; 2016, 109-50). In addition, the three countries are 
interwoven with national security matters and economic inter-dependency, 
which is highly inconsistent and contradictory. These complicated relations are 
another crucial factor that continues to transform the role of government in 
economic policies in China, Japan, and South Korea.     
• Translated by CHOI Eun Jung
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